TLDR: Ford CEO Jim Farley pitched a concept to senior Trump officials that would have been unthinkable two years ago: joint ventures where U.S. automakers hold controlling stakes in partnerships with Chinese EV companies. GM opposes the idea entirely. The split between Detroit’s two largest automakers on how to handle Chinese competition may prove more consequential than any tariff.
For three decades, China required every Western automaker to partner with a domestic company before selling a single car on Chinese soil. GM, Ford, Toyota, Volkswagen all complied. They shared technology, split profits, and built the Chinese auto industry from the inside.
Now Jim Farley wants to flip the script.
The Pitch
According to Bloomberg, Ford’s CEO discussed the concept of Chinese joint ventures with three senior Trump administration officials: USTR Jamieson Greer, Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy, and EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin. The proposed structure mirrors China’s own playbook in reverse: the American company holds a controlling stake, both parties share profits and technology, and the Chinese partner brings the EV and battery expertise that Detroit doesn’t have.
The reception was cold. Trump officials feared political backlash in Washington, where “partnering with China” is a phrase that ends careers in both parties. But the conversation happened, and the fact that it happened at the level of Greer and Duffy makes it serious.
Farley didn’t stop there. Ford has separately held talks with BYD about expanding their existing battery supply partnership. The strategic direction is clear: Ford believes Chinese EV technology is too advanced to beat, so the rational play is to access it under controlled terms.
The GM Wall
General Motors reportedly told the administration it opposes Chinese entry into the U.S. market regardless of structure. That’s not posturing. It’s a fundamentally different strategic bet.
GM is investing in its own battery technology through Ultium, scaling domestic EV production at Factory Zero, and building a supply chain that deliberately excludes Chinese partners. Where Ford sees Chinese technology as something to harness, GM sees it as something to wall off.
The split matters because a unified Detroit front against Chinese competition was the foundation of current trade policy. The 100% tariff on Chinese vehicles exists partly because both major U.S. automakers supported it. If Ford breaks rank and advocates for Chinese partnerships, even controlled ones, the policy consensus fractures.
Trump himself sent mixed signals. At the Detroit Economic Club on January 13, he suggested he’d “let China come in” if Chinese companies build plants and hire Americans. An April Trump-Xi meeting in Beijing could be the venue for a broader investment framework. The political window, if there is one, may be narrow and unpredictable.
What Ford Knows That GM Won’t Say
The numbers explain Farley’s urgency. BYD sold over 3 million vehicles globally in 2024, more than every American EV maker combined. Chinese manufacturers offer EVs with comparable range and features at 30% to 50% lower prices. LFP battery cells cost $53 per kilowatt-hour in China, according to BloombergNEF. Ford’s own EV division has lost billions.
The tariff wall keeps Chinese vehicles out of the U.S. market, but it doesn’t close the technology gap. Every year the wall stands, the gap widens. Farley is making a calculation that access to Chinese battery and manufacturing technology through a controlled JV is better than falling further behind while hiding behind tariffs.
Canada is already moving. Prime Minister Carney’s deal slashing Chinese EV tariffs from 100% to 6.1% for 49,000 units annually means BYD and other Chinese brands will be selling on the North American continent within months. If Chinese EVs are available at C$35,000 in Toronto, the pressure on U.S. policy intensifies regardless of what GM wants.
The History Lesson Detroit Should Remember
The irony is sharp. When Western automakers entered China through joint ventures in the 1990s and 2000s, the conventional wisdom was that China needed Western technology and would never catch up. China used those partnerships to learn, adapt, and eventually surpass its teachers. Farley is betting the dynamic can work in reverse, that a U.S. controlled JV would transfer technology to Detroit rather than away from it. History suggests that’s optimistic. The partner with the technology advantage tends to be the partner that benefits most.
But Farley may not need the JV to work perfectly. He may just need it to work well enough to close the cost gap before the tariff wall becomes politically unsustainable. That’s a lower bar, and arguably a realistic one.
The question for the industry isn’t whether Chinese technology enters the U.S. auto market. Canada’s deal, BYD’s tariff lawsuit, and Ford’s JV pitch all point in the same direction. The question is whether Detroit negotiates the terms or gets overtaken while debating whether to try.
